The flagship architect course. Over four hands-on days you design, secure, deploy, scale and prove production AgentPass agent estates end to end: agent identity and PKI, MCPS message signing on every action, OFAC and sanctions checks, autonomous payments, key management and rotation, a hardware kill switch, and non-repudiable evidence of everything an agent did. Built on the open agent-trust standards authored by your instructor. The 1-day AgentPass Agent Deployment course is the hands-on foundation; this is where you go deeper.
AgentPass implements the agent-trust standards your instructor authors: MCPS for per-message signing of every agent action, ATTP for agent trust transport, the OpenAPI x-agent-trust extension, and payment trust via draft-sharif-agent-payment-trust. Mapped to the OWASP MCP Top 10 and AISVS.
Protocols for human interaction are not enough on their own. A human-in-the-loop approval flow gates the actions a person happens to see; an autonomous agent takes thousands it does not. Only cryptographic signing of every action gives you a provable record of what the agent actually did. That is why AgentPass signs first and asks a human only where it matters. See the MCPS Internet-Draft.
The 2026-07-28 MCP release candidate makes the protocol stateless: the initialize/initialized handshake and the Mcp-Session-Id header are removed, so every request stands alone, and the new Mcp-Method / Mcp-Name routing headers (SEP-2243) are unauthenticated. Its six authorization SEPs harden OAuth 2.0 / OpenID Connect -- issuer validation per RFC 9207 (SEP-2468), OIDC application_type in Dynamic Client Registration (SEP-837), and issuer-bound credentials (SEP-2352) -- but they still rely on bearer tokens. Sender-constrained tokens (DPoP, RFC 9449) and hardware attestation remain a proposal -- SEP #1461, "Attested Client Registration and Proof-of-Possession" -- and did not ship in this release candidate. Until that lands, a stolen access token is replayable and no individual message is authenticated. That is exactly the gap AgentPass and MCPS close: every agent action is signed with a nonce and timestamp. OAuth authenticates the client; MCPS authenticates every message.
Classes are custom built from the following learning modules. The recommended 4-day format is shown. (Times are approximate.)
What makes agent estate architecture different from traditional service architecture. The six properties every agent estate must have: identity, trust scoring, per-action signing, payment controls, audit and kill switches. Why missing any one of them leaves a gap that cannot be closed later.
A review of the protocol landscape: OAuth limitations for agents, agent-as-itself identity, Cross-App Access, ID-JAG, AAuth, DPoP, SPIFFE and MCP authorization. For delegates who completed AGPASS-531 this is a refresher. For those who did not, it brings them up to speed. We focus on how each protocol shapes architecture decisions.
Deep walkthrough of every AgentPass component: the identity service, trust engine, ledger, payment gateway, MCPS signing proxy and the admin API. How they interact, what state each holds, and the failure modes when any component goes down.
How to write architecture decisions that a security review board, a regulator or a future architect can follow. The ADR format, what to include, and how to document tradeoffs. Every design decision in this course produces an ADR.
Designing identity for multiple teams, business units or customers sharing one agent estate. Tenant isolation, namespace design, credential scoping and the boundary between shared infrastructure and tenant-specific policy.
Root key placement (HSM, cloud KMS, on-prem), intermediate CA hierarchy, certificate lifetime policy and the rotation calendar. Designing a PKI that scales to thousands of agents without becoming a single point of failure or an operational burden.
Trust domains, federation between trust domains, SPIRE server topology (nested vs federated) and the tradeoffs. When to use a single trust domain and when to federate.
Automating issuance, rotation and revocation. Integration with CI/CD pipelines so new agents get credentials at deploy time and retired agents lose them at teardown. Zero standing credentials.
Designing the trust model for your organisation. Which actions sit at which level. How trust is earned, how it degrades, and the signals that trigger demotion. The policy document that governs all of it.
Hands on: write trust policies in OPA Rego. Express your organisation's trust rules as testable, version-controlled code. Deploy policy changes without redeploying agents.
Designing the escalation ladder: which actions proceed autonomously, which notify, which block for human approval, and which require hardware approval. How to avoid both "everything needs approval" (unusable) and "nothing needs approval" (unsafe).
When agents delegate to other agents, how does trust propagate? Scope attenuation by design, depth limits, and what happens when a high-trust agent delegates to a low-trust agent. Patterns that prevent privilege laundering.
Choosing payment rails for agent estates: Stripe for card payments, Lightning for micropayments, and the abstraction layer that lets you switch without re-architecting. Settlement timing, reconciliation and the evidence each rail produces.
Where to place sanctions screening in the architecture. Pre-payment vs pre-action screening. List update frequency, caching strategy and the latency budget. Designing for the case where the screening service is down (answer: block, not bypass).
Mapping your agent estate architecture to AISVS (C05, C09, C12), EU AI Act (Articles 12, 13, 14, 15, 50), NIST AI RMF and sector-specific requirements. Producing the compliance evidence pack from your architecture documentation.
Agents that operate across jurisdictions. Where credentials are issued, where payments are processed, where logs are stored. Data residency constraints and how they shape the architecture. GDPR, Saudi PDPL and other territorial requirements.
Designing the audit ledger for an agent estate. Hash chain integrity, dual-signature strategy (ECDSA + ML-DSA-65), storage backend selection, retention policy and the query patterns auditors and incident responders need. Backup and disaster recovery for the ledger.
Metrics, logs and traces for agent estates. What to instrument, what to alert on, and the dashboards that operations and security teams each need. Integration with existing SIEM and observability stacks.
Designing the incident response path for agent incidents. Detection, containment (credential revocation, swarm kill), investigation (ledger queries, timeline reconstruction) and recovery.
Designing the estate so that when an incident occurs, the evidence is already there. Logging requirements, evidence retention and the infrastructure that makes forensic investigation possible without scrambling.
Hands on: build a threat model for a complete agent estate. Identify trust boundaries, enumerate threats (credential theft, trust escalation, payment fraud, delegation abuse, log tampering), and map each threat to an architectural control. Produce a threat model document.
What happens when each component fails. AgentPass down, ledger unreachable, payment provider timeout, SPIRE unavailable, hardware approval device offline. Designing for graceful degradation where safe and hard stop where not.
The agent estate will outlive current cryptography. ML-DSA-65 dual signing in the ledger, ML-KEM key exchange readiness and the migration path. What to do now and what to wait on.
Exam rules, deliverables, time limit and marking criteria.
Each delegate receives a scenario: an organisation with a specific agent population, regulatory environment, payment requirements and risk profile. Design the full agent estate architecture: identity, trust, payments, audit, monitoring and incident response. Produce ADRs, a threat model, a deployment diagram and a compliance mapping. Present and defend your design.
Walkthrough of the reference architecture, discussion of design choices, common mistakes and marking criteria. Delegates who demonstrate competence receive the CyberSecAI ACA credential.
Design and deploy a multi-tenant agent identity structure. Issue credentials for agents in two tenants, verify isolation, test cross-tenant access (it must fail).
Write and deploy trust policies in OPA. Test graduated escalation: L0 through L4 actions, verify each fires at the correct threshold. Attempt trust escalation attacks.
Deploy a payment flow with sanctions screening across two payment rails. Verify receipts, test screening against sanctioned entities, verify fail-closed on screening service failure.
Build a threat model for a provided agent estate scenario. Identify threats, map to controls, identify gaps and propose mitigations. Peer review with another delegate.
Simulate component failures across the estate. Verify fail-closed behaviour, verify the ledger integrity survives, verify agents stop acting when they should.
Cryptographic identity and signed actions give you three things a human-in-the-loop protocol cannot: control of your agent, non-repudiation of what it did, and a hard stop on IP and data leaking out through it. Approval flows alone do not scale to an agent taking thousands of autonomous actions a minute. AgentPass signs each one. See the MCPS Internet-Draft.
When an agent moves money, the same rules apply and the evidence has to hold. You wire OFAC and sanctions screening into the agent's decision path, apply AML controls to autonomous payments, and sign every payment into a record an auditor and a regulator will accept. Grounded in the OWASP cheat sheet on AML and sanctions for AI agent payments, authored by your instructor.
AgentBee is the hardware kill switch you deploy in this course. Plug it in, and an AgentPass agent cannot move money, delete data, deploy, or take other high-stakes actions until a person physically approves on the device. It is human authority, in hardware.
Every approval is signed with FIDO-grade crypto (ECDSA P-256): a tamper-evident record of who authorised what. Signing on every action, hardware approval on the ones that matter, and instant revocation for the rest.
agentbee.co.uk →Every action an AgentPass agent takes is signed, so when you need to reconstruct what happened you have provable evidence, not guesswork. This brings real forensic discipline to agent systems, taught by an instructor qualified in cyber-forensics.
Every tool call and action carries an MCPS signature you can verify later.
Which agent acted, under whose authority, bound to a certificate.
Signed actions and human approvals that cannot be denied later.
Nonces and verification that stop a captured action being replayed.
Rebuild what an agent did from the tamper-evident, signed trail.
A record an auditor, a court and a regulator will accept.
No slideware. You deploy real agents on a live AgentPass instance backed by cloud GPUs, sign their actions, wire the sanctions checks and the kill switch, and prove the controls hold.
Design agent estates you can deploy, secure, scale and prove.
Stand up and operate AgentPass across the estate.
Add agent identity, signing and kill switches to your remit.
Agents that move money, with OFAC, sanctions and AML built in.
Govern autonomous action with signed evidence and control.
This is the definitive architect course. The path is clear: complete the Enterprise course plus the AgentPass course, and you earn the AgentPass Certified Architect (CyberSecAI ACA) credential. Assessment is practical: over the four days you architect, deploy and operate a live AgentPass estate, sign its actions, wire the sanctions checks, payments and kill switch, and produce the evidence. On a passing result, the candidate is awarded the credential.
Prefer to start smaller? The 1-day AgentPass hands-on foundation course →
Four days, hands-on, deploying on live AgentPass, taught by the former OWASP-AISVS Co-Leader (v1.0) and the author of the MCPS, ATTP and agent-payment-trust Internet-Drafts. Places are limited.
Corporate & sovereign cohorts, and bespoke on-site delivery, on request.