Deploy production AI agents on AgentPass in a single hands-on day: agent identity and PKI, MCPS message signing on every action, OFAC and sanctions checks, agent-to-agent and agent-to-merchant payments, and a kill switch that halts a rogue agent instantly. Built on open agent-trust standards authored by your instructor. This is the hands-on foundation course of the AgentPass Architect track.
AgentPass implements the agent-trust standards your instructor authors: MCPS for per-message signing of every agent action, ATTP for agent trust transport, the OpenAPI x-agent-trust extension, and payment trust via draft-sharif-agent-payment-trust. Mapped to the OWASP MCP Top 10 and AISVS.
Protocols for human interaction are not enough on their own. A human-in-the-loop approval flow gates the actions a person happens to see; an autonomous agent takes thousands it does not. Only cryptographic signing of every action gives you a provable record of what the agent actually did. That is why AgentPass signs first and asks a human only where it matters. See the MCPS Internet-Draft.
The 2026-07-28 MCP release candidate makes the protocol stateless: the initialize/initialized handshake and the Mcp-Session-Id header are removed, so every request stands alone, and the new Mcp-Method / Mcp-Name routing headers (SEP-2243) are unauthenticated. Its six authorization SEPs harden OAuth 2.0 / OpenID Connect -- issuer validation per RFC 9207 (SEP-2468), OIDC application_type in Dynamic Client Registration (SEP-837), and issuer-bound credentials (SEP-2352) -- but they still rely on bearer tokens. Sender-constrained tokens (DPoP, RFC 9449) and hardware attestation remain a proposal -- SEP #1461, "Attested Client Registration and Proof-of-Possession" -- and did not ship in this release candidate. Until that lands, a stolen access token is replayable and no individual message is authenticated. That is exactly the gap AgentPass and MCPS close: every agent action is signed with a nonce and timestamp. OAuth authenticates the client; MCPS authenticates every message.
Classes are custom built from the following learning modules. Instructors select ~8 hours for a 1-day delivery. Extended 2-day format covers the full catalog. (Times are approximate.)
AI agents are not human users and not static machines, but every identity system we have only handles those two. OAuth was designed for a human clicking a consent screen. OIDC assumes a browser redirect. When an autonomous agent runs at 3am with no human present, the consent model collapses, refresh tokens sit unattended, and "act as the user" delegation stops making sense. This module walks through the specific failure modes: consent without a human, token lifetimes longer than agent lifetimes, no way to attribute actions to the agent vs the user, and scope models that cannot express what an agent actually needs.
The fundamental shift happening across the industry: instead of an agent borrowing a user's identity, the agent holds its own. It presents its own credentials, earns its own trust score, and is accountable in its own right. This changes authorization (the agent's permissions are not the user's permissions), audit (the log says which agent, not which user), and liability (who is responsible when the agent acts). We cover what "agent-as-itself" means in practical terms, how it differs from service accounts, and why it matters for compliance.
Cross-App Access is a proposal for how an agent running inside one application can securely call into another application on behalf of its operator. It addresses the problem that today an agent either gets the user's full token (too much access) or gets nothing (no interoperability). We walk through how Cross-App Access scopes the grant, what the trust model looks like between the two applications, and where it sits relative to OAuth client credentials.
ID-JAG defines a JWT-based grant format for agents operating across organisational boundaries. When Agent A in Company X needs to call a service in Company Y, ID-JAG provides the token format, the claims structure and the verification model. We cover the grant lifecycle, how scope attenuation works as the token crosses domains, and the trust anchor requirements. We compare it to federated OIDC and explain where ID-JAG fills gaps that federation does not.
AAuth proposes an authorization model where agents request permissions based on what they need to do, not who they are acting for. The authorization server evaluates the agent's identity, its declared intent and its trust history, then issues a scoped token. This is a different model from OAuth's "user grants access to client" pattern. We walk through the request flow, how intent declaration works, how the authorization server makes its decision, and the open questions around trust bootstrapping.
DPoP binds a token to the specific key that requested it, so a stolen token is useless without the private key. For agents this matters because tokens travel through tool chains, message queues and delegation hops where interception is a real risk. We cover how DPoP works (the proof JWT, the thumbprint binding), how to implement it in agent flows, and why sender-constrained tokens are becoming a baseline expectation.
SPIFFE gives every workload a cryptographic identity (an SVID) without shared secrets, passwords or API keys. For agents running in Kubernetes, VMs or serverless, SPIFFE provides identity at the infrastructure layer that the agent can present to any service. We cover SPIFFE IDs, JWT-SVIDs vs X.509-SVIDs, trust domains, trust bundles, JWKS endpoints and how SPIRE (the reference implementation) issues and rotates credentials automatically.
The Model Context Protocol now includes an authorization layer for tool access. When an agent calls a tool through MCP, the server can require the agent to present credentials and prove it is authorized for that specific tool. We cover the MCP auth flow, how it integrates with OAuth 2.1, the resource indicators extension, and the practical gaps: what MCP authorization handles (tool-level access) and what it does not handle (agent identity, provenance, payment authorization).
Three problems that cut across every protocol. Delegation: how an agent proves who gave it authority and how much. Scope attenuation: how authority narrows as it passes through a chain of agents, so Agent C cannot do more than Agent B authorized, which cannot do more than Agent A authorized. Provenance: how a receiving system traces a request back through the chain to the original authority. We show how each protocol above addresses (or fails to address) each problem.
Humans revoke access on HR timelines. Agents need revocation in seconds. We cover token lifetime strategies, real-time credential revocation, swarm-wide kill and the gap between what the specifications define and what actually works in production. Short-lived tokens, pushed revocation events and the tradeoff between revocation latency and verification cost.
The landscape is noisy. Some "protocols" are open specifications at IETF or OpenID Foundation with public review. Some are product features with a specification-shaped name. We teach you how to tell the difference: where to find the actual drafts, how to read their maturity level, what "adopted" vs "individual draft" means, and which ones to pilot now vs wait on vs avoid.
How AgentPass works end to end: identity issuance, trust scoring, the ledger, payment rails and the API surface. What each component does, how they connect, and where AgentPass sits relative to the protocols covered in the landscape section.
Register, credential, deploy, monitor, rotate, revoke. The six stages every production agent moves through. What happens at each stage, what evidence is produced, and what can go wrong.
L0 untrusted through L4 critical. What each level permits, how trust is earned through behaviour and how it is revoked instantly.
Hands on: issue ECDSA P-256 agent credentials through AgentPass. Bind agent name, owner, capabilities and trust level into a signed identity document the agent carries.
Hands on: configure SPIFFE workload identity for agents on AgentPass. JWT-SVIDs, trust bundles and JWKS endpoints. Zero shared secrets across clusters.
Hands on: configure key rotation with rollover periods. AWS KMS, GCP KMS and Vault backends. What happens to in-flight sessions during rotation.
How the AgentPass root key (HSM-protected, never extracted) anchors the trust chain. Verifying an agent credential from leaf to root.
Hands on: sign agent messages with MCPS. Nonce, timestamp, ECDSA signature over canonical JSON (RFC 8785 JCS). What each field does and why skipping any field breaks the security model.
Nonce windows, timestamp drift tolerance and the specific replay attacks that MCPS stops. Hands on: attempt to replay a signed request and watch it get rejected.
Server-side verification of MCPS signatures. Rejecting unsigned, expired and malformed requests. The fail-closed path.
MCPS over HTTP, WebSocket, stdio and MCP transports. Where signing sits in each transport stack and what the transport layer does not protect.
Hands on: wire AgentPass trust levels into payment authorization. L3 agents can move money with a signed receipt. L4 agents need human approval before any payment clears.
Hands on: screen agent counterparties against the live OFAC SDN and UK HMT sanctions lists (75,000+ entries) before any financial action proceeds.
Every payment produces a signed receipt in the AgentPass ledger. Verify receipts, check the hash chain, and export evidence for compliance.
Hands on: connect AgentPass payment flows to Stripe test mode. Webhook signature verification and livemode guards.
Hands on: wire AgentBee hardware approval into L4 agent actions. Critical actions block until a human physically approves. Signed approval receipt returned. If the device is unreachable, the action does not proceed.
Revoking an agent credential in real time. Swarm revocation: killing an entire agent group with one API call.
What happens when AgentPass, the payment provider or the approval device is unreachable. Every path defaults to denial.
Hands on: query the ledger. Every registration, credential issuance, payment, approval and revocation recorded with ECDSA + ML-DSA-65 dual signatures and a hash chain.
Anomaly detection on agent activity: velocity spikes, unusual tool calls, scope drift. What to alert on and what to auto-revoke.
Exporting ledger records for auditors and regulators. Evidence packs that map to AISVS C09 and C12.
Register an agent, issue credentials, deploy it with MCPS signing, make a trust-gated payment with sanctions screening, trigger a kill switch and verify everything in the ledger.
An agent is compromised. Revoke its credentials, verify it can no longer act, check the ledger records and produce the incident evidence pack.
Cryptographic identity and signed actions give you three things a human-in-the-loop protocol cannot: control of your agent, non-repudiation of what it did, and a hard stop on IP and data leaking out through it. Approval flows alone do not scale to an agent taking thousands of autonomous actions a minute. AgentPass signs each one. See the MCPS Internet-Draft.
When an agent moves money, the same rules apply and the evidence has to hold. You wire OFAC and sanctions screening into the agent's decision path, apply AML controls to autonomous payments, and sign every payment into a record an auditor and a regulator will accept. Grounded in the OWASP cheat sheet on AML and sanctions for AI agent payments, authored by your instructor.
AgentBee is the hardware kill switch you deploy in this course. Plug it in, and an AgentPass agent cannot move money, delete data, deploy, or take other high-stakes actions until a person physically approves on the device. It is human authority, in hardware.
Every approval is signed with FIDO-grade crypto (ECDSA P-256): a tamper-evident record of who authorised what. Signing on every action, hardware approval on the ones that matter, and instant revocation for the rest.
agentbee.co.uk →Every action an AgentPass agent takes is signed, so when you need to reconstruct what happened you have provable evidence, not guesswork. This brings real forensic discipline to agent systems, taught by an instructor qualified in cyber-forensics.
Every tool call and action carries an MCPS signature you can verify later.
Which agent acted, under whose authority, bound to a certificate.
Signed actions and human approvals that cannot be denied later.
Nonces and verification that stop a captured action being replayed.
Rebuild what an agent did from the tamper-evident, signed trail.
A record an auditor, a court and a regulator will accept.
No slideware. You deploy real agents on a live AgentPass instance backed by cloud GPUs, sign their actions, wire the sanctions checks and the kill switch, and prove the controls hold.
Stand up and operate AgentPass across the estate.
Ship autonomous agents that pass security review.
Add agent identity, signing and kill switches to your remit.
Agents that move money, with OFAC, sanctions and AML built in.
Design agent systems you can deploy, secure and prove.
Govern autonomous action with signed evidence and control.
The path is clear: complete the Enterprise course plus the AgentPass course, and you earn the AgentPass Certified Architect (CyberSecAI ACA) credential. Assessment is practical: you deploy a live AgentPass agent, sign its actions, wire the sanctions checks, payments and kill switch, and produce the evidence. On a passing result, the candidate is awarded the credential.
One day, hands-on, deploying on live AgentPass, taught by the former OWASP-AISVS Co-Leader (v1.0) and the author of the MCPS, ATTP and agent-payment-trust Internet-Drafts. Places are limited.
Corporate & sovereign cohorts, and bespoke on-site delivery, on request.