1-Day Course · Hands-on
AgentPass Architect Track · 1-Day

AgentPass Agent Deployment

Deploy production AI agents on AgentPass in a single hands-on day: agent identity and PKI, MCPS message signing on every action, OFAC and sanctions checks, agent-to-agent and agent-to-merchant payments, and a kill switch that halts a rogue agent instantly. Built on open agent-trust standards authored by your instructor. This is the hands-on foundation course of the AgentPass Architect track.

Grounded in the standards

Built on the open agent-trust standards

AgentPass implements the agent-trust standards your instructor authors: MCPS for per-message signing of every agent action, ATTP for agent trust transport, the OpenAPI x-agent-trust extension, and payment trust via draft-sharif-agent-payment-trust. Mapped to the OWASP MCP Top 10 and AISVS.

Protocols for human interaction are not enough on their own. A human-in-the-loop approval flow gates the actions a person happens to see; an autonomous agent takes thousands it does not. Only cryptographic signing of every action gives you a provable record of what the agent actually did. That is why AgentPass signs first and asks a human only where it matters. See the MCPS Internet-Draft.

MCP 2026-07 update -- why per-message signing still matters

The 2026-07-28 MCP release candidate makes the protocol stateless: the initialize/initialized handshake and the Mcp-Session-Id header are removed, so every request stands alone, and the new Mcp-Method / Mcp-Name routing headers (SEP-2243) are unauthenticated. Its six authorization SEPs harden OAuth 2.0 / OpenID Connect -- issuer validation per RFC 9207 (SEP-2468), OIDC application_type in Dynamic Client Registration (SEP-837), and issuer-bound credentials (SEP-2352) -- but they still rely on bearer tokens. Sender-constrained tokens (DPoP, RFC 9449) and hardware attestation remain a proposal -- SEP #1461, "Attested Client Registration and Proof-of-Possession" -- and did not ship in this release candidate. Until that lands, a stolen access token is replayable and no individual message is authenticated. That is exactly the gap AgentPass and MCPS close: every agent action is signed with a nonce and timestamp. OAuth authenticates the client; MCPS authenticates every message.

You will be able to

What you can do after the course

AGPASS-531. The syllabus

One day, from deploy to proof

Classes are custom built from the following learning modules. Instructors select ~8 hours for a 1-day delivery. Extended 2-day format covers the full catalog. (Times are approximate.)

Agent Protocol Landscape

The Identity and Authorization Problem, Mapped

49-00 Why OAuth and OIDC Break for Agents 1 hr

AI agents are not human users and not static machines, but every identity system we have only handles those two. OAuth was designed for a human clicking a consent screen. OIDC assumes a browser redirect. When an autonomous agent runs at 3am with no human present, the consent model collapses, refresh tokens sit unattended, and "act as the user" delegation stops making sense. This module walks through the specific failure modes: consent without a human, token lifetimes longer than agent lifetimes, no way to attribute actions to the agent vs the user, and scope models that cannot express what an agent actually needs.

49-01 Agent-as-Itself Identity 1 hr

The fundamental shift happening across the industry: instead of an agent borrowing a user's identity, the agent holds its own. It presents its own credentials, earns its own trust score, and is accountable in its own right. This changes authorization (the agent's permissions are not the user's permissions), audit (the log says which agent, not which user), and liability (who is responsible when the agent acts). We cover what "agent-as-itself" means in practical terms, how it differs from service accounts, and why it matters for compliance.

49-02 Cross-App Access 1 hr

Cross-App Access is a proposal for how an agent running inside one application can securely call into another application on behalf of its operator. It addresses the problem that today an agent either gets the user's full token (too much access) or gets nothing (no interoperability). We walk through how Cross-App Access scopes the grant, what the trust model looks like between the two applications, and where it sits relative to OAuth client credentials.

49-03 ID-JAG (Inter-Domain JWT Agent Grants) 1 hr

ID-JAG defines a JWT-based grant format for agents operating across organisational boundaries. When Agent A in Company X needs to call a service in Company Y, ID-JAG provides the token format, the claims structure and the verification model. We cover the grant lifecycle, how scope attenuation works as the token crosses domains, and the trust anchor requirements. We compare it to federated OIDC and explain where ID-JAG fills gaps that federation does not.

49-04 Autonomous Agent Authorization (AAuth) 1 hr

AAuth proposes an authorization model where agents request permissions based on what they need to do, not who they are acting for. The authorization server evaluates the agent's identity, its declared intent and its trust history, then issues a scoped token. This is a different model from OAuth's "user grants access to client" pattern. We walk through the request flow, how intent declaration works, how the authorization server makes its decision, and the open questions around trust bootstrapping.

49-05 DPoP (Demonstrating Proof of Possession) 0.5 hr

DPoP binds a token to the specific key that requested it, so a stolen token is useless without the private key. For agents this matters because tokens travel through tool chains, message queues and delegation hops where interception is a real risk. We cover how DPoP works (the proof JWT, the thumbprint binding), how to implement it in agent flows, and why sender-constrained tokens are becoming a baseline expectation.

49-06 SPIFFE and Workload Identity 1 hr

SPIFFE gives every workload a cryptographic identity (an SVID) without shared secrets, passwords or API keys. For agents running in Kubernetes, VMs or serverless, SPIFFE provides identity at the infrastructure layer that the agent can present to any service. We cover SPIFFE IDs, JWT-SVIDs vs X.509-SVIDs, trust domains, trust bundles, JWKS endpoints and how SPIRE (the reference implementation) issues and rotates credentials automatically.

49-07 MCP Authorization 1 hr

The Model Context Protocol now includes an authorization layer for tool access. When an agent calls a tool through MCP, the server can require the agent to present credentials and prove it is authorized for that specific tool. We cover the MCP auth flow, how it integrates with OAuth 2.1, the resource indicators extension, and the practical gaps: what MCP authorization handles (tool-level access) and what it does not handle (agent identity, provenance, payment authorization).

49-08 Delegation, Scope Attenuation and Provenance 1 hr

Three problems that cut across every protocol. Delegation: how an agent proves who gave it authority and how much. Scope attenuation: how authority narrows as it passes through a chain of agents, so Agent C cannot do more than Agent B authorized, which cannot do more than Agent A authorized. Provenance: how a receiving system traces a request back through the chain to the original authority. We show how each protocol above addresses (or fails to address) each problem.

49-09 Revocation at Machine Speed 0.5 hr

Humans revoke access on HR timelines. Agents need revocation in seconds. We cover token lifetime strategies, real-time credential revocation, swarm-wide kill and the gap between what the specifications define and what actually works in production. Short-lived tokens, pushed revocation events and the tradeoff between revocation latency and verification cost.

49-10 Open Standards vs Vendor Branding 0.5 hr

The landscape is noisy. Some "protocols" are open specifications at IETF or OpenID Foundation with public review. Some are product features with a specification-shaped name. We teach you how to tell the difference: where to find the actual drafts, how to read their maturity level, what "adopted" vs "individual draft" means, and which ones to pilot now vs wait on vs avoid.

AgentPass Foundations

Architecture, Lifecycle and Trust

50-00 AgentPass Architecture 1 hr

How AgentPass works end to end: identity issuance, trust scoring, the ledger, payment rails and the API surface. What each component does, how they connect, and where AgentPass sits relative to the protocols covered in the landscape section.

50-01 The Agent Lifecycle 0.5 hr

Register, credential, deploy, monitor, rotate, revoke. The six stages every production agent moves through. What happens at each stage, what evidence is produced, and what can go wrong.

50-02 Trust Levels and What They Gate 0.5 hr

L0 untrusted through L4 critical. What each level permits, how trust is earned through behaviour and how it is revoked instantly.

PKI and Agent Identity

Credentials, Keys and Trust Anchors

51-00 Agent Credential Issuance 1.5 hrs

Hands on: issue ECDSA P-256 agent credentials through AgentPass. Bind agent name, owner, capabilities and trust level into a signed identity document the agent carries.

51-01 SPIFFE Integration 1 hr

Hands on: configure SPIFFE workload identity for agents on AgentPass. JWT-SVIDs, trust bundles and JWKS endpoints. Zero shared secrets across clusters.

51-02 Key Management and Rotation 1 hr

Hands on: configure key rotation with rollover periods. AWS KMS, GCP KMS and Vault backends. What happens to in-flight sessions during rotation.

51-03 Certificate Chains and Trust Anchors 0.5 hr

How the AgentPass root key (HSM-protected, never extracted) anchors the trust chain. Verifying an agent credential from leaf to root.

MCPS Per-Action Signing

Sign Every Message on the Wire

52-00 MCPS Wire Format 1 hr

Hands on: sign agent messages with MCPS. Nonce, timestamp, ECDSA signature over canonical JSON (RFC 8785 JCS). What each field does and why skipping any field breaks the security model.

52-01 Replay Protection 0.5 hr

Nonce windows, timestamp drift tolerance and the specific replay attacks that MCPS stops. Hands on: attempt to replay a signed request and watch it get rejected.

52-02 Signature Verification 0.5 hr

Server-side verification of MCPS signatures. Rejecting unsigned, expired and malformed requests. The fail-closed path.

52-03 Transport Integration 0.5 hr

MCPS over HTTP, WebSocket, stdio and MCP transports. Where signing sits in each transport stack and what the transport layer does not protect.

Payments, OFAC and Sanctions

When Agents Move Money

53-00 Payment Trust Gating 1 hr

Hands on: wire AgentPass trust levels into payment authorization. L3 agents can move money with a signed receipt. L4 agents need human approval before any payment clears.

53-01 OFAC and Sanctions Screening 1 hr

Hands on: screen agent counterparties against the live OFAC SDN and UK HMT sanctions lists (75,000+ entries) before any financial action proceeds.

53-02 Signed Payment Receipts 0.5 hr

Every payment produces a signed receipt in the AgentPass ledger. Verify receipts, check the hash chain, and export evidence for compliance.

53-03 Stripe Integration 0.5 hr

Hands on: connect AgentPass payment flows to Stripe test mode. Webhook signature verification and livemode guards.

Kill Switches, Monitoring and Ledger

Control, Observe, Prove

54-00 Hardware Human Approval 1 hr

Hands on: wire AgentBee hardware approval into L4 agent actions. Critical actions block until a human physically approves. Signed approval receipt returned. If the device is unreachable, the action does not proceed.

54-01 Credential Revocation 0.5 hr

Revoking an agent credential in real time. Swarm revocation: killing an entire agent group with one API call.

54-02 Fail-Closed Patterns 0.5 hr

What happens when AgentPass, the payment provider or the approval device is unreachable. Every path defaults to denial.

55-00 The AgentPass Ledger 1 hr

Hands on: query the ledger. Every registration, credential issuance, payment, approval and revocation recorded with ECDSA + ML-DSA-65 dual signatures and a hash chain.

55-01 Behavioural Monitoring 0.5 hr

Anomaly detection on agent activity: velocity spikes, unusual tool calls, scope drift. What to alert on and what to auto-revoke.

55-02 Export and Compliance Reporting 0.5 hr

Exporting ledger records for auditors and regulators. Evidence packs that map to AISVS C09 and C12.

Labs

Hands-On Deployment Labs

56-00 Full Agent Deployment Lab 2 hrs

Register an agent, issue credentials, deploy it with MCPS signing, make a trust-gated payment with sanctions screening, trigger a kill switch and verify everything in the ledger.

56-01 Revocation and Incident Lab 1 hr

An agent is compromised. Revoke its credentials, verify it can no longer act, check the ledger records and produce the incident evidence pack.

~32 hrs
Total instructional hours
33
Individual modules across 8 sections
1-2 days
Flexible delivery
Why signing is required

Sign every action, or you cannot prove any of them.

Cryptographic identity and signed actions give you three things a human-in-the-loop protocol cannot: control of your agent, non-repudiation of what it did, and a hard stop on IP and data leaking out through it. Approval flows alone do not scale to an agent taking thousands of autonomous actions a minute. AgentPass signs each one. See the MCPS Internet-Draft.

Money & compliance

OFAC, sanctions and agent payments

When an agent moves money, the same rules apply and the evidence has to hold. You wire OFAC and sanctions screening into the agent's decision path, apply AML controls to autonomous payments, and sign every payment into a record an auditor and a regulator will accept. Grounded in the OWASP cheat sheet on AML and sanctions for AI agent payments, authored by your instructor.

The hardware in the loop

AgentBee

AgentBee hardware human-approval key

AgentBee is the hardware kill switch you deploy in this course. Plug it in, and an AgentPass agent cannot move money, delete data, deploy, or take other high-stakes actions until a person physically approves on the device. It is human authority, in hardware.

Every approval is signed with FIDO-grade crypto (ECDSA P-256): a tamper-evident record of who authorised what. Signing on every action, hardware approval on the ones that matter, and instant revocation for the rest.

agentbee.co.uk →
Agentic forensics

Prove exactly what an agent did

Every action an AgentPass agent takes is signed, so when you need to reconstruct what happened you have provable evidence, not guesswork. This brings real forensic discipline to agent systems, taught by an instructor qualified in cyber-forensics.

SIGNED

Signed action records

Every tool call and action carries an MCPS signature you can verify later.

IDENTITY

Agent identity & PKI

Which agent acted, under whose authority, bound to a certificate.

NON-REPUDIATION

Non-repudiation

Signed actions and human approvals that cannot be denied later.

REPLAY

Replay protection

Nonces and verification that stop a captured action being replayed.

RECONSTRUCT

Incident reconstruction

Rebuild what an agent did from the tamper-evident, signed trail.

ADMISSIBILITY

Evidence that holds

A record an auditor, a court and a regulator will accept.

GPU-backed labs

Hands-on, deploying on live AgentPass

No slideware. You deploy real agents on a live AgentPass instance backed by cloud GPUs, sign their actions, wire the sanctions checks and the kill switch, and prove the controls hold.

Who it is for

Built for the people shipping agents

Platform & DevOps engineers

Stand up and operate AgentPass across the estate.

AI & agent developers

Ship autonomous agents that pass security review.

Security engineers

Add agent identity, signing and kill switches to your remit.

Fintech & payments teams

Agents that move money, with OFAC, sanctions and AML built in.

Architects

Design agent systems you can deploy, secure and prove.

GRC & risk

Govern autonomous action with signed evidence and control.

The certification

AgentPass Certified Architect — CyberSecAI ACA

The path is clear: complete the Enterprise course plus the AgentPass course, and you earn the AgentPass Certified Architect (CyberSecAI ACA) credential. Assessment is practical: you deploy a live AgentPass agent, sign its actions, wire the sanctions checks, payments and kill switch, and produce the evidence. On a passing result, the candidate is awarded the credential.

Go deeper: the 4-day AgentPass Certified Architect course →

Reserve a place

Deploy agents you can control and prove.

One day, hands-on, deploying on live AgentPass, taught by the former OWASP-AISVS Co-Leader (v1.0) and the author of the MCPS, ATTP and agent-payment-trust Internet-Drafts. Places are limited.

1 day intensive, hands-on GPU-backed labs Private corporate cohorts available
Reserve a Place

Corporate & sovereign cohorts, and bespoke on-site delivery, on request.